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The Role of the Ombuds in a Knowledge-Intensive Corporation:  
A Partner for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
Over 40 years ago, Peter Drucker observed that the U.S. corporate sector was shifting 
away from employing mostly industrial workers, toward employing increasing numbers 
of “knowledge workers” who “appl[y] to productive work ideas, concepts, and 
information rather than manual skill or brawn.”i At that time, Drucker believed that 
“making knowledge work productive will be the great management task of this century.”ii 
Today, well into the new century, we continue to discuss how management strategies can 
be adapted to meet the challenges of the knowledge economy.  One area that should be 
receiving a lot more attention within this discussion is the role of conflict management in 
creating organizational success for knowledge-intensive corporations.  The purpose of 
this article is to show that one particular decision – establishing an Office of the Ombuds 
– is very effective in enabling knowledge workers to perform better and the corporation 
to function smarter.  
The Attributes of Knowledge Workers Present Organizational Challenges that Can Be 
Effectively Addressed by a Specialized Approach to Conflict Management
Thomas Davenport defines knowledge workers in the following way: “[k]nowledge 
workers have high degrees of expertise, education, or experience, and the primary 
purpose of their jobs involves the creation, distribution, or application of knowledge.”iii  
They are people who invent new products and services, design marketing programs, 
create strategies for distribution, and manage customer relationships.iv  Although 
knowledge workers have many different areas of expertise, they share several common 
attributes with respect to the way they function in the workplace.  Most notably, they are 
collaborators:  knowledge workers are interdependent across physical locations and time 
zones, and must communicate with one another, many times across functional areas, in 
order to accomplish their tasks.v  Knowledge workers are members of social networks, 
which they use to exchange information and gain knowledge that is helpful to them.vi  
They like autonomy and tend to work independent of management.vii  As a result, they are 
subject to much less observation than the workers of the past and are to a large degree 
free from a supervisor’s daily instructions.viii
The common attributes of knowledge workers provide clues as to how the corporate 
organization should structure itself to manage them.  For two main reasons, corporate 
leaders should consider creating a specialized position to address the challenges posed by 
a knowledge workforce, as part of a coordinated conflict management strategy.
First, interpersonal conflicts between knowledge workers can dramatically affect their 
performance.ix  A conflict between two or more persons, whose duties require 
collaboration on tasks and projects, will have a ripple effect on the work of colleagues 
who rely on them.  Relatedly, an unresolved conflict between leaders of functional areas 
can give rise to significant productivity issues for the corporation.  Not every knowledge 
worker has the skill to keep operational groups in sync and focused on task.  Therefore, 
management must have ways to intervene in order to keep individuals and groups 
functioning together.  One effective method of intervention is to contract for a skilled 
neutral facilitator to help resolve interpersonal tensions and encourage collaboration.x  
Consequently, integrating conflict resolution capacity into the organization is a smart way 
of maximizing performance of knowledge workers.xi
Second, in order to be protected from exposure to liability, corporate leaders must be 
made aware of potentially harmful problems if and when such problems develop.  In the 
past, supervisors could be relied upon to observe potential problems at the ground level 
and report their findings through formal channels at the organization’s Human Resources, 
Finance, or Legal departments.  However, knowledge workers’ autonomy in performing 
tasks and projects means that their supervisors will generally not have direct knowledge 
of how their work was produced.  It is within this area of unknown activity that potential 
liability for the corporation exists.  Therefore, knowledge-intensive corporations, rather 
than depending on supervisors for information, must receive notice of potential liability 
from the knowledge workers themselves.  The prospect of receiving notice from 
knowledge workers is complicated by the fact that they tend to be reluctant to engage the 
corporation’s formal bureaucratic processes.xii  
At a time when laws such as Dodd-Frank, the False Claims Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley can 
penalize organizations for performing acts that management had no awareness or notice 
of occurring, knowledge-intensive corporations cannot afford to rely on their employees 
to make formal reports of potential problems.  Instead, knowledge workers should be 
encouraged to provide information in a way that is simple and comfortable for them.  
This can be accomplished by providing an intermediary who is available to surface 
problem areas and make informed reports to formal channels if necessary.  Early notice 
of risk is the only way for corporate leaders to be in position to mitigate damage.
The two areas of concern identified above overlap because both require intervention into 
the knowledge workforce in order to be properly addressed.  Traditionally, each concern 
falls under the purview of two different components of the corporation’s organizational 
hierarchy:  the CEO is concerned with maximizing workers’ performance and the 
corporation’s productivity; while the Board of Directors is concerned with managing risk 
and limiting exposure to liability.  The CEO and the Board should recognize the overlap 
and seek a way to get the results they need without interfering with the other’s function.  
An Ombuds can provide the answer.xiii 
What Is an Ombuds?
An organizational Ombuds (historically sometimes referred to as an “ombudsman”) is an 
expert in the field of conflict management who understands the sources of conflict in a 
workplace environment, knows how to discuss problems that arise from such conflict, 
and is experienced in encouraging interested parties to mitigate and prevent those and 
similar problems from arising in the future.  The Office of the Ombuds offers a 
confidential setting for employees to visit and discuss their concerns without fear of 
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retaliation or judgmental criticism.  In this connection, the Ombuds may act as a coach or 
confidante, and uses his or her expertise to advise employees on whether and how to 
address their concerns.  With permission from the employee, the Ombuds may 
communicate information to others who could be helpful in solving problems raised by 
the employee.  In doing so, the Ombuds may act as a mediator, assist with negotiations 
through shuttle diplomacy, or convene group meetings and act as a facilitator of 
constructive dialogue.  Without violating employees’ expectation of confidentiality, the 
Ombuds compiles data concerning observed trends and areas of concern, and makes 
reports of his or her findings to the CEO and Board of Directors.
An Ombuds should be expected to assist in building the conflict competency of the 
organization.  In this regard, the Ombuds typically provides skills training to first-line 
supervisors and upper-level managers, consisting of:  concepts from the interest-based 
bargaining model of negotiation; how to discuss difficult topics without assigning blame; 
group facilitation skills; and how to counsel individual employees about their 
organizational options for addressing a complaint or dispute.  The goal of the Ombuds’s 
activities is to encourage a problem-solving managerial culture aimed at preventing daily, 
standard, conflicts from metastasizing into problems that can harm the entire corporation. 
In theory, the Ombuds’s success in building conflict management redundancies into the 
organizational system will maximize the likelihood that losses of productivity and 
violations of law will not occur.
The Office of the Ombuds is Engaged in Early, Informal Conflict Management
It is possible to visualize a corporation’s conflict management functions as existing on a 
horizontal line, starting with “less formal” modes of conflict resolution, and moving 
toward “more formal” modes of conflict resolution.  By describing some approaches to 
conflict management as “less formal,” we mean approaches that tend to allow the parties 
involved in a dispute to resolve the matter themselves, with little external influence on 
their ability to make decisions; while “more formal” approaches to conflict management 
generally involve significant intervention from a theretofore uninvolved third party (such 
as from the Legal department, the CEO, or the Board of Directors), which may share in 
decision-making and restrict the number of options for resolving a dispute.  More 
“formal” approaches to conflict management usually require contemporaneous record-
keeping and written reports of investigation, whereas the Office of the Ombuds does not 
keep records of individual cases.  
Pursuant to this visualization of the corporation’s conflict management functions, the 
Office of the Ombuds exists on the “informal” section of the line.  The Ombuds’s 
informal role begins when he or she is first contacted by an employee.  Upon receiving a 
call or visit, the Ombuds acts as a sounding board for the employee’s belief that there is a 
problem.  During the initial interview of the employee, the Ombuds listens, asks 
clarifying questions, and attempts to accurately summarize what has been said, in the 
effort to assist the employee in defining the problem that is believed to exist.  More than 
one meeting may occur, where the Ombuds may offer advice and coaching to the 
employee.  
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The Ombuds’s knowledge of the nature of workplace conflicts enables him or her to 
know when to promote resolutions at the ground level, or whether to encourage the 
employee to make a formal report or complaint to one of the corporation's formal 
departments (such as Finance, Legal, or Human Resources).  If the employee is reticent 
to engage the formal reporting process, the Ombuds may make a tactful report in the 
employee’s stead, without revealing the employee’s name.  In this connection, the 
Ombuds understands that some problems may hold such risk for the corporation that they 
cannot be solved without input from top level leaders.
How Does an Ombuds Encourage Excellent Performance and Mitigate Risk?
An Ombuds is of high utility to the corporation because of his or her capacity to evaluate 
problems and act as a router for their appropriate method of resolution:  as a result of the 
Ombuds’s coaching, some problems can be resolved by the individual employee; some 
may be resolved through the Ombuds’s intervention as a mediator, facilitator, or informal 
diplomat; while others should be referred to formal channels if they carry risk of 
exposing the organization to various forms of liability.  
The following are three examples of common workplace problems:  (1) an employee may 
believe that an unsatisfactory performance review is motivated by hostility from his or 
her supervisor; (2) an employee may believe a manager is covering up misuse of a 
corporate credit card; (3) coworkers may disagree about a particular strategy or design for 
a project.  
With respect to the first two examples, the corporation’s formal departments might be 
required to intervene if the employee reports the problem to them:  the performance 
review would be a subject for Human Resources, and possibly the Legal department if 
the employee were to report an associated charge of discrimination; while the alleged 
misuse of a corporate credit card could be a subject for Finance or Legal departments.  It 
must be recognized, however, that employees are reluctant to report problems for fear of 
retaliation.  In addition, some problems risk not being reported to the organization’s 
formal departments if employees do not believe the subject matter fits within one of the 
departments’ areas of responsibility.  For example, in the case of the third example, a 
dispute over work product is traditionally the responsibility of a supervisor and as such 
would probably not be reported to any formal department.  But what if one of the 
disputants is the supervisor – in that situation, who would be available to intervene in 
order to address the problem?  Or what if, as is often the case with knowledge workers, 
management is unaware of the coworkers’ disagreement and the workers are left to try to 
resolve it without assistance?  
These situations are where an Office of the Ombuds is valuable.  Due to the informal 
nature of the Office, employees will approach the Ombuds with concerns that they might 
not ordinarily report anywhere else, and will do so at an earlier juncture than they would 
anywhere else.  That is, employees are more likely to talk about a matter that concerns 
them, in an environment they consider to be safe and private, than they would in an 
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environment where they know their names will be on record and their concerns may be 
the subject of a formal investigation.  
In the case of tensions between or among colleagues working on a project, an Ombuds 
can respond to a request for assistance by offering his or her services as a facilitator.  
Often, an Ombuds’s ability to facilitate dialogue among affected workers allows them to 
address their problem in a different way, resolve it, and get back on task.
Again referencing the above examples, the Ombuds might suggest mediating a 
conversation involving the employee and his or her manager concerning the performance 
review, where a goal of the mediation might be to create a more positive working 
relationship between the two individuals.  With respect to the alleged misuse of the 
corporate credit card, the Ombuds might advise the concerned employee of the 
availability of formal channels for filing a report; or might refer the matter to the CEO or 
Board, without sacrificing the employee’s confidence, if the Ombuds believes the 
situation warrants such contact.
In a knowledge-intensive corporation, workplace problems such as these can negatively 
affect performance by impeding workers’ ability to collaborate and gather essential 
information for doing their jobs.  By addressing interpersonal tensions in the manner 
suggested here, the Ombuds’s work can be expected to generate immediate results with 
respect to knowledge workers’ performance.
The Office of the Ombuds also provides early warning of internal developments that may 
carry risk for the company.  In this regard, the collapse of MF Global provides a timely 
example of the worst that can happen when a company does not have an effective system 
for identifying problems and mitigating exposure to liability.  In a nutshell, MF Global’s 
failure to heed the advice of its Chief Risk Officer set in motion a chain of events that let 
to its downfall.  Specifically, in September 2010, then-Chief Risk Officer, Michael 
Roseman, warned CEO Jon Corzine that the company’s bets on European sovereign debt, 
which at that time stood between $1.5 billion and $2 billion in exposure, presented a 
significant liquidity risk.  Mr. Corzine disagreed with that assessment – and in October, 
he asked Mr. Roseman to seek permission from the Board to raise the stakes to $4.75 
billion.  Mr. Roseman repeated his concerns to the Board, but the scenarios he presented 
were rejected as implausible.  In January 2011, the company hired Michael Stockman to 
replace Mr. Roseman as Chief Risk Officer.xiv  In his February 2012 testimony before 
congress, Mr. Stockman stated that in his first several months he relied on analysis 
performed by his department to conclude that the company’s positions were acceptable.  
However, by the summer of 2011, when the company’s exposure to European sovereign 
debt had grown to more than $6 billion, Mr. Stockman recommended that the company 
take steps to mitigate the financial risks.xv
It was too late.  Earlier, in May 2011, FINRA learned of MF Global’s debt exposure and 
grew concerned there was not enough money set aside in case the trades went bad.  As a 
result, FINRA enlisted the help of the SEC, which in late August required the company to 
put additional capital into reserve.  News reports of this event emerged in early October, 
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causing MF Global’s customers to flee and its stock price to plunge.  A week later, 
Moody’s cut its rating to one level above junk status.  By October 31, 2011, MF Global 
declared bankruptcy.xvi
These facts suggest that MF Global’s collapse could have been avoided if the Board had 
followed Mr. Roseman’s advice in 2010.  Although Mr. Corzine’s contrary opinion was 
surely persuasive, an Ombuds’s contribution, had it existed, would have added weight to 
Mr. Roseman’s recommendation.  In this connection, we know from reports that more 
than one senior manager shared Mr. Roseman’s concerns in 2010, but were afraid to 
confront such an imposing figure as the CEO.xvii  If an Ombuds had been available to 
compile and relay those concerns, MF Global’s Board might have recognized that the 
presence of uneasiness with regard to the company’s investment positions, from multiple 
sources within the organization, highlighted not only the financial risks inherent in the 
trades but also risk of exposure to legal claims should the trades result in damage to the 
value of the company.  Indeed, these same employees may provide testimony to support 
civil lawsuits against MF Global’s executives and the Board, for breach of fiduciary duty 
to the firm and its customers.xviii As of this writing, Corzine is the subject of a civil 
lawsuit brought by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in U.S. District Court 
in Manhattan, accusing him of misusing M.F. Global's customer's money during the final 
days of the company.xix
In sum, a corporation should not rely solely on formal complaints, or its formal 
departments, to identify and address potentially harmful problems.  Instead, the 
organization should seek knowledge of problem areas at the earliest possible juncture, 
before real damage or illegality can occur.  In each of the examples discussed above, an 
Ombuds would have the opportunity to either mitigate internal conflict or encourage the 
corporation resolve a problem before it develops into a larger problem.  Ombuds’ work 
can also have the effect of precluding similar problems from developing in the future.  
These attributes – continually active efforts at early problem resolution and conflict 
prevention – set the Office of the Ombuds apart from the other conflict management 
functions of the organization.
What Makes a Corporate Ombuds Successful?
Trust is most important.  In order to create and maintain trust, the Ombuds must 
demonstrate to all of the people who make up the corporation – knowledge workers, 
management, chief executives and the Board – that the Ombuds can be relied on to 
protect its core principles.  The three core principles to which a corporate Ombuds must 
abide are confidentiality, independence, and impartiality.
Confidentiality.  The Ombuds must be perceived as maintaining the confidentiality of 
interactions with employees, as they are more likely to fully disclose information if they 
are confident that their communications will not be repeated without permission.  The 
Ombuds supports this interest by not maintaining case files for recordkeeping purposes, 
destroying any notes made during calls or interviews, and having no obligation to 
investigate allegations or report visitors’ identities.  A challenging area of the Ombuds's 
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work is how to report potentially damaging allegations of wrongdoing in situations where 
the source of the allegation wishes to remain anonymous.  One way to accomplish this, 
for example, is for the Ombuds to report general areas of concern or trends to corporate 
leaders, without mentioning any employee by name.  The Ombuds must be careful, 
however, not to describe any particular situation that could impliedly reveal the identity 
of an informing individual.  The Ombuds’s duty to maintain strict confidentiality may be 
breached only in a narrow exception:  when the Ombuds discovers an imminent risk of 
serious harm to an individual or the entire corporation, and there appears to be no other 
reasonable option but to report the situation.
Independence.  The Ombuds must be perceived as not beholden or responsible to anyone 
other than the top leadership of the corporation.  For that reason, the Ombuds responds to 
directions from the CEO and the Board of Directors and no one else.  Any other 
arrangement could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest should the Ombuds at 
some point intervene in a dispute involving a functionary located somewhere beneath the 
very top level.  Also, the Ombuds must be perceived as not having a long-term personal 
financial interest in the corporation.  This is important because the Ombuds should have 
no incentive to keep any conflict hidden, including those that might affect the Ombuds’s 
Office or impact the value of the corporation.  Ombuds’ independence may be achieved 
by requiring the position to be filled for a term of office rather than for an indefinite 
period.  If a corporation were to consider retaining a current or prior employee to fill the 
Ombuds position, the hiring committee should confirm that the candidate has no intention 
of remaining in another capacity after the term of employment ends. 
Employees’ communications to the Ombuds are not recognized as providing the 
corporation with legal notice of potentially illegal acts, as long as the Office of the 
Ombuds makes the following public announcements:  the Ombuds is independent and 
free from control of the corporation’s formal departments; the Ombuds has no 
management responsibilities outside its own office; and the purpose of the Office is not to 
receive notice of legal claims.xx  This is significant because, in the event a corporation 
becomes aware of an alleged violation of laws, regulations, or policies, the corporation 
must take steps to mitigate the damage or else face exponentially worse exposure down 
the line for not acting.  As such, there can be no promise of anonymity for an employee 
who reports a problem to a formal channel within the organization.  When the proper 
public announcements are made, however, visitors to the Office of the Ombuds can feel 
secure that the Ombuds is under no legal obligation reveal their identity to the 
corporation without their permission (except under the narrow exception to 
confidentiality identified above).xxi  In the event the Ombuds relays employees’ concerns 
to a formal channel within the organization, legal notice occurs.
Impartiality.  The Ombuds must be perceived by everyone as neither an agent of 
management nor an advocate for employees’ concerns.  An Ombuds cannot be effective 
if he or she takes sides in a dispute.  For one reason, employees might not feel 
comfortable visiting the Ombuds if they believe the Ombuds might judge them negatively 
or act as a substitute for management.  For another, management officials might be 
reluctant to give due consideration to what the Ombuds has to say if they believe the 
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Ombuds has a political agenda in favor of employees.  Therefore, the Ombuds should be 
careful not to make a judgment against any person or be an advocate for any particular 
outcome; instead, the Ombuds should be focused on conflict management skill and 
effectiveness, by endeavoring to listen well, speak diplomatically, and help individuals to 
be aware of their options for addressing a particular problem. 
For the corporate Ombuds, the value that gives life to these three core principles is good 
governance.  It is a value that corporate leaders and employees should share; and is 
ultimately the motivation for creating and maintaining a position that everyone within the 
organization can trust.  Therefore, the corporation should enact a charter for the Office of 
the Ombuds that states good governance as an underlying value, along with the three core 
principles referenced here.  The charter should also state the Ombuds’s authority to, 
among other things:  (1) engage in prevention and resolution of workplace conflict; and 
(2) surface internal problems in order to prevent and mitigate the corporation’s exposure 
to liability.  In practice, this means that the corporate Ombuds must know when to 
encourage ground-level resolution of a problem, and when to advise that it be referred to 
a formal resolution process.  In doing so, the Ombuds must be mindful of the core 
Ombuds principles and have an understanding of how they might be implicated by a 
multitude of fact patterns.  Accordingly, the Board of Directors should search for 
candidates who have acquired skills and abilities necessary to support the Ombuds 
function.  Practicing ombudspersons, mediators, or lawyers, who have demonstrated 
leadership qualities and ability to resolve conflict, should be considered.
Conclusion
For today’s knowledge-intensive corporations, impediments to collaboration can 
negatively affect the organization’s performance and results.  An Ombuds can facilitate 
collaboration by providing a forum for early intervention, resolution, and prevention of 
conflict within knowledge workers’ offices.  The Ombuds’s presence as a liaison for 
remedying employee concerns doubles as an early warning system for problems that 
might, if unreported or left unchecked, develop into exposure to liability for the 
corporation.  Given Ombuds’ ability to clear impediments to performance and forestall 
risk, the CEO and Board of Directors should be strongly encouraged to establish an 
Office of the Ombuds if they have not already done so.
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